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1 Introduction
The interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) and the hard problem of consciousness
are two puzzling problems that are seemingly separate. Among all the mainstream inter-
pretations of QM, Everett’s relative-state (RS) interpretation is perhaps the only realist
view that preserves the simplicity of QM, despite being counter-intuitive. It has a counter-
part, which is constitutive Russellian pan(proto)psychism (CRP). As a promising solution
to the hard problem of consciousness, CRP also holds a simple but counter-intuitive view
of realism.
It is possible that RS and CRP are in fact deeply related. They both realise some
symmetry between micro- and macrosystems (distinguished in terms of the sizes of the
physical systems under consideration). In particular, RS extends the quantum world,
originally for microsystems only, to cover macrosystems. It claims that an observed re-
sult is not about the state of a microsystem alone, but instead about the state of a
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microsystem relative to the state of an observer, which is a macrosystem. CRP, on the
other hand, extends phenomenal properties to microsystems, thus realising symmetry in
the opposite direction. It is perhaps unwise to argue for the two proposals separately,
as extra psychophysical laws might be required in either case. Arguing for both simul-
taneously, on the other hand, releases much theoretical burden, and may bind the two
options into one that solves both problems, e.g. the interpretation of QM and the hard
problem of consciousness.
The strategy is to show that CRP and RS are not only consistent, but also provide
support to each other. Rejecting one entails rejection of the other. Therefore, if critics
accuse one of them being counter-intuitive while deeming the other acceptable, they
would hesitate to reject either.
2 Arguments for Mutual Support
2.1 From CRP to RS
We may first ask CRP to provide support to the RS interpretation of QM. First, let’s
define CRP properly. Phenomenal properties are the properties characterising what it
is like to be something. Panpsychism holds that phenomenal properties are instantiated
in some microsystems, e.g. fundamental particles, as well as microphysical properties.
Such phenomenal properties are called microphenomenal properties, in contrast to the
macrophenomenal properties that are instantiated in conscious beings like us. Panpro-
topsychism, on the other hand, suggests the instantiation of protophenomenal properties
in microsystems, which are themselves not phenomenal, but in combination they consti-
tute phenomenal properties. Russellian pan(proto)psychism is the thesis that microphe-
nomenal or protophenomenal properties are the categorical bases (quiddities) of micro-
physical properties. Constitutive pan(proto)psychism is the thesis that all macrophenom-
enal truths are grounded in micro(proto)phenomenal truths.
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Now switch to quantum mechanics. If we examine alternative interpretations of QM,
there are two general classes regarding the interpretation of quantum states (or wave
functions). The anti-realist view that quantum states merely play an epistemic role leads
us to the somehow instrumental Copenhagen interpretation and the more radical quan-
tum Bayesianism (QBism). On the other side of the spectrum, treating quantum states as
ontological entities leaves us with two options, depending on whether wave function col-
lapse is ontological or merely epistemic. The former consists of various versions of collapse
theories, and the latter consists of hidden variable theories and the RS interpretation.
Collapse theorists insist that there is a physical collapse process which reduces quantum
states to their classical counterparts. This includes objective collapse theories and the
von Neumann-Wigner interpretation which argues that consciousness plays a role in the
collapse process. On the other hand, hidden variable theorists claim that the quantum
mechanical indeterminism is due to the incompleteness of the quantum-state description
of reality. Collapse merely reflects our lack of knowledge (about the values of the hid-
den variables). Our strategy here is to combine CRP with each of these alternatives to
demonstrate their incompatibility.
For epistemic interpretation of quantum states, we will take QBism as an example.
It claims that quantum states are merely epistemic, reflecting the partial knowledge we
have about reality. Collapse is therefore an inferential process (e.g. Bayesian inference)
that reduces our belief from a partially informed quantum state to the fully informed
classical counterpart. Metaphysically only classical entities exist and evolve according
to the laws of classical physics. But then how do we explain the unitary evolution of
wave function? If it is purely epistemic, it is arguably isomorphic to certain laws (or
relations) that govern the dynamics of our macrophenomenal properties. According to
CRP, macrophenomenal truths are grounded in micro(proto)phenomenal truths, which in
turn ground microphysical truths categorically. Therefore, unitary evolution is likely to
be isomorphic to certain truths (structural or relational) about microphysical properties.
But if quantum states are merely epistemic, no microphysical relation is isomorphic to
unitary evolution (or other relations in QM that are missing in classical physics). So the
epistemic interpretation is arguably incompatible with CRP. To put this formally:
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1. If CRP is true, then macrophenomenal truths and microphysical truths are both
grounded in micro(proto)phenomenal truths.
2. If quantum states are epistemic, then some macrophenomenal relations are isomorphic
to unitary evolution (we simply say some macrophenomenal relations are unitary).
3. If some macrophenomenal relations are unitary, and macrophenomenal truths are
grounded in micro(proto)phenomenal truths, then some micro(proto)phenomenal rela-
tions are unitary.
4. If some micro(proto)phenomenal relations are unitary and they ground certain micro-
physical relations, then the grounded microphysical relations are also unitary.
5. If quantum states are merely epistemic, no microphysical relation is unitary.
∴ 6. If CRP is true, quantum states are not merely epistemic.
Proponents of the epistemic interpretation may reject point 2, 3 or 4. On point 2
they may argue that mathematical truths are epistemic but are probably not grounded
in macrophenomenal truths. However, mathematical knowledge is not within our direct
acquaintance. Instead, certain logical inference is required to acquire such knowledge.
But when I let an electron evolve and then re-measure its state, no inference is explicitly
needed in order to grasp the result. If the evolution merely goes on in my head, then
it is reasonable to ask for its ground. On point 4, one might argue that CRP does not
explicitly rule out the possibility that certain micro(proto)phenomenal relations do not
ground microphysical relations. Even if this is possible, it introduces extra relations that
are physically irrelevant. This is perhaps a very dualistic view of CRP and is ontologically
costy. Besides, it faces the problem of epiphenomenalism. Perhaps the only viable objec-
tion is against point 3, arguing that unitary evolution is emergent upon the constitution
of macrophenomenal properties. But this cannot be explained either empirically (our
perception seems to match perfectly well with what the laws of classical physics dictate)
or evolutionarily (having QM laws embedded does not improve our adaptability and is
not an economic evolutionary strategy).
The von Neumann-Wigner interpretation holds a view of realism for both quantum
states and their collapse. It further claims that our own consciousness plays a causal
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role in the collapse process. This means that certain macrophenomenal properties trigger
collapse. If we accept CRP, then macrophenomenal properties can be reduced to mi-
cro(proto)phenomenal properties (plus some physical properties). Therefore certain col-
lections of micro(proto)phenomenal properties trigger collapse. But collapse, commonly
regarded as a fundamental process, is arguably not strongly emergent. This is more clear
if we take a panpsychist view: either none of the phenomenal properties would neces-
sitate collapse, or any of the phenomenal properties would necessitate collapse. But if
the latter is true, collapse is universal, contradicting the facts about QM and the von
Neumann-Wigner interpretation itself. To put this formally:
1. If CRP is true, then all macrophenomenal properties are constituted by micro(proto)-
phenomenal properties.
2. If the von Neumann-Wigner interpretation is true, then only certain macrophenomenal
properties (that entail our own consciousness) necessitate collapse.
3. If all macrophenomenal properties are constituted by micro(proto)phenomenal prop-
erties and only some necessitate collapse, then only some combinations of micro(proto)-
phenomenal properties necessitate collapse.
4. If only some combinations of micro(proto)phenomenal properties necessitate collapse,
then collapse is strongly emergent.
5. Collapse as a fundamental process is not strongly emergent.
∴ 6. If CRP is true, then the von Neumann-Wigner interpretation is false.
One might reject point 4 by arguing from a panprotopsychist perspective: collapse
may be necessitated by any phenomenal properties, which, however, are constituted only
by certain combinations of protophenomenal properties. Even if this is true, it does
not render the argument invalid. In fact, Russellian panprotopsychism supports that
microphysical truths are grounded in protophenomenal truths. Therefore, collapse, ne-
cessitated by only certain protophenomenal combinations, is arguably necessitated by the
corresponding microphysical combinations. If one accepts that collapse is a physical pro-
cess and that the physical world is causally closed, then being triggered only by certain
microphysical combinations still makes collapse strongly emergent.
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Objective collapse theories hold that wave function collapse results from the interac-
tion between the microsystem and the measuring apparatus, irrespective of the presence
of consciousness. They regard unitary evolution as an incomplete part of QM, supple-
mented by a non-unitary collapse process which is size-dependent. For microsystems,
collapse does not occur (or occurs only occasionally), while for macrosystems such pro-
cess occurs almost immediately.
If objective collapse theories are true, then an electron either never collapses or col-
lapses at an extremely low rate. But the latter case indeed requires a preferred basis.
This is already suspicious, as favouring a particular set of spin states – say spin along
the z-axis – breaks the rotational symmetry. For the sake of the collapse theories, let’s
assume the electron is not that fundamental, and its internal mechanism is in charge of
such symmetry breaking. At any rate, an electron collapses to a basis which depends
primarily on its environment, say the apparatus and the observer. If we set up the ap-
paratus to measure its spin along the x-axis, the electron would collapse to definite spin
states along the x-axis, even if it has a preferred basis along the z-axis.
If microphysical truths are grounded in micro(proto)phenomenal truths, then arguably
the micro(proto)phenomenal properties of an electron would collapse to the correspond-
ing basis set dictated by its environment (under a spin measurement, say). Since nothing
is fundamentally different between the electron and its environment (according to CRP
they are both grounded in the same possible set of microphysical and microphenomenal
truths), the dominance of the environment is arguably explained by its relatively large
size. Now think about the whole world as a huge apparatus that performs a measurement
on me. Even if our phenomenal properties collapse to our own preferred basis sufficiently
frequently, it is possible for the environment-induced collapse to occur even more fre-
quently. It is unclear why our phenomenal properties can only collapse to those definite
states, but not the superposed ones even under very different environments. To put this
formally:
1. If CRP is true, then micro(proto)phenomenal properties are categorical bases for mi-
crophysical properties, and collectively they constitute macrophenomenal properties.
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2. If collapse is objective, then a microsystem (e.g. an electron) collapses to a basis
depending on its environment (e.g. apparatus and observer in a measurement).
3. If microphysical properties collapse to a basis depending on the environment, and their
categorical bases are micro(proto)phenomenal properties, then micro(proto)phenomenal
properties also collapse to a basis depending on the environment.
4. If micro(proto)phenomenal properties collapse to a basis depending on the environ-
ment, and they collectively constitute macrophenomenal properties, then macrophenom-
enal properties collapse to a basis depending on the environment.
5. If the collapse basis for macrophenomenal properties depends on the environment,
then the set of possible macrophenomenal properties varies with the environment.
6. Our set of possible macrophenomenal properties does not vary with the environment.
∴ 7. If CRP is true, collapse is not objective.
Finally, let’s consider the epistemic interpretation of wave function collapse, which
holds that quantum states are ontological entities while their collapse is merely epistemic.
Both hidden variable theories and the RS interpretation fall into this category. The
previous incompatibility arguments, which attack either the epistemic picture of quantum
states or the ontological picture of collapse, are inapplicable to them. Between hidden
variable theories and the RS interpretation, the former seems to suffer from heavier
ontological burden due to the introduction of hidden variables and their guiding laws.
They add ontological complexity without making further detectable predictions, thus not
a favourable option according to Occam’s razor. On the other hand, the “let quantum be
quantum” picture of the RS interpretation preserves the simplicity and elegance of QM.
Besides, hidden variable theories have to sacrifice locality for determinism as a result of
Bell’s theorem. The simplest version, Bohmian mechanics, introduces particle positions as
hidden variables, as well as additional laws (e.g. the guiding equation and the quantum
equilibrium hypothesis) merely to remove indeterminism. The hidden variables along
with their laws are independent of the unitary evolution of wave function (which is now
called “pilot wave”), and serve as extra theoretical constructions. If CRP is true, then
micro(proto)phenomenal properties have to be structured in a more complex way in
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order to ground the two layers of microphysical properties, the pilot wave and the hidden
variable. At any rate, the RS interpretation is more plausible in terms of what is required
to construct the micro(proto)phenomenal properties.
Overall, accepting CRP rules out most options, leaving RS perhaps the most plausible
interpretation. Because both physicalism and dualism suffer from severe objections, the
conceivability/knowledge arguments for the former and the causal argument for the latter
(see Chalmers 2015), CRP is perhaps the only viable option immune to objections from
either side. Therefore, the analysis above provides support to the seemingly counter-
intuitive RS interpretation of QM.
2.2 From RS to CRP
Now we will reverse the direction of our argument to see if RS could offer some support
to CRP. In fact, if RS is true, then the whole world is by nature quantum mechanical
and governed by unitary evolution only. Classical phenomena emerge from interactions,
say between a system and its environment, by mechanisms such as quantum Darwinism
(see Zurek 2009).
Consider a conscious system, such as my brain. It consists of a large number of subsys-
tems with quite complex interactions. Consciousness (or macrophenomenal properties)
emerges not from some special spatial distribution, but instead from non-spatial relations
between the subsystems (e.g. causal relations or bonding relations). One can imagine
that a magical elf comes into my brain and re-arranges these subsystems spatially, while
preserving their non-spatial relations. The same state of consciousness would arguably
persist. This is to say, consciousness supervenes nomologically on the subsystems and
the structure of their non-spatial relations.
If RS is true, then Hilbert space (plus the unitary maps written on it) is arguably
the unique source of such structure. Between two Hilbert spaces, the main non-spatial
structural difference lies in their dimensions. But merely a dimensional difference is prob-
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ably incapable of explaining phenomenal properties being associated only with certain
macrosystems. It is more plausible to associate phenomenal properties with any system,
regardless whether it is a macrosystem or a microsystem. The whole argument, however,
presupposes that the phenomenal truths are wholly grounded in structural truths. To
put this formally:
1. If RS is true, then non-spatial structural truths are wholly grounded in dimensional
truths.
2. If phenomenal truths are wholly grounded in structural truths, then they are wholly
grounded in non-spatial structural truths.
3. If phenomenal truths are wholly grounded in non-spatial structural truths and the
latter are wholly grounded in dimensional truths, then phenomenal truths are wholly
grounded in dimensional truths.
4. If phenomenal truths are wholly grounded in dimensional truths, then they are not
fundamentally different across systems.
5. If phenomenal truths are not fundamentally different across systems, then phenomenal
properties are universal.
6. If phenomenal properties are universal, then panpsychism is true.
∴ 7. If RS is true and phenomenal truths are wholly grounded in structural truths, then
panpsychism is true.
Critics may reject point 1 by claiming that there are additional non-spatial structural
truths that are not grounded in dimensional truths. It is plausible that physics describes
all properties that are structural or dispositional. So these additional truths have to
be realised in physical terms. Under the “let quantum be quantum” picture of the
RS interpretation, the full physical picture of a system can be described simply by the
unitary evolution of its quantum state (regarded as a vector in Hilbert space). The non-
spatial structure is arguably either about the dimension of the complete Hilbert space
that describes the whole system, or about the dimensions of its subspaces “travelled” by
unitary evolution.1 Alternatively, critics may reject point 4 by arguing that phenomenal
1In order to reduce the dimension of Hilbert space into a finite dimension, we need to discretise the
physical space and assume consciousness is not lost after such discretisation. Now suppose a brain has a
microphysical state in an N-dimensional Hilbert space. Given its Hamiltonian, an n-dimensional subspace
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properties are strongly emergent upon certain dimensional properties. It is hard to see
how this is possible. Perhaps there are critical dimensions above which phenomenal
properties emerge. But still this is not convincing.
The argument above supports panpsychism, given that phenomenal truths are wholly
grounded in structural truths. On the other hand, if phenomenal truths are not wholly
grounded in structural truths, then they are also grounded in non-structural or categor-
ical truths, which are by definition (proto)phenomenal. It is noted that any property of
the conscious system is constituted by the properties of its subsystems along with their
structures. Since (proto)phenomenal properties are not structural properties, in order
to have them instantiated in the conscious system, they must already be instantiated in
the constitutive subsystems. For a given conscious system, its subsystems are somewhat
indefinite. We may in fact regard all the constitutive microsystems as such subsystems.
This entails the instantiation of (proto)phenomenal properties in these microsystems,
supporting a version of pan(proto)psychism. To put this formally,
1. If phenomenal truths are not wholly grounded in structural truths, then they are
grounded in non-structural truths of subsystems that constitute the conscious system.
2. If phenomenal truths are grounded in non-structural truths of the constitutive sub-
systems, then they are grounded in (proto)phenomenal truths of the subsystems.
3. If phenomenal truths are grounded in (proto)phenomenal truths of the constitu-
tive subsystems, then instantiation of phenomenal properties entails instantiation of
(proto)phenomenal properties in the subsystems.
4. Phenomenal properties are instantiated in a conscious system constituted by a large
is associated with consciousness, assuming that any superposition of conscious states is also a conscious
state. Since conscious states remain conscious under unitary evolution, the conscious subspace has to
be an invariant subspace. We may regard it as a spectral subspace of a binary-valued “consciousness
observable”, whatever it is, which commutes with the Hamiltonian. Maybe the consciousness observable
is a function of other physical observables that commute with the Hamiltonian. At any rate, it is the only
observable other than the Hamiltonian that is ever relevant to the structural explanation of consciousness.
Note that commutativity is required in order to guarantee spectral subspaces of the observable to be
invariant under unitary evolution. Apart from a unitary basis transform, the Hamiltonian and the
consciousness observable can be fully recovered by the dimensions of their spectral subspaces, along with
the corresponding eigenvalues. Since eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian provide energy levels which are not
part of the structural information, structural truths relevant to consciousness may be represented solely
by a list of dimensions (n1,m1), (n1,m2), · · · . A pair (ni,mi) contains structural truths about the i-th
spectral subspace of the Hamiltonian (dimension ni + mi reflects energy degeneracy), decomposed into
an ni-dimensional conscious subspace and an mi-dimensional unconscious subspace.
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number of microsystems.
5. If (proto)phenomenal properties are instantiated in the microsystems that constitute
a conscious system, then pan(proto)psychism is true.
∴ 6. If phenomenal truths are not wholly grounded in structural truths, pan(proto)psychism
is true.
A possible objection to point 2 is that the non-structural truths involved are not
(proto)phenomenal truths. Instead they are about the instantiation of dispositional prop-
erties or quiddities (i.e. categorical bases of physical dispositions). But the dispositions,
such as mass or electric charge, are ultimately about relations and structures, and reveal
themselves only in interactions. Therefore, their instantiation is rather specified in struc-
tural truths. On the other hand, quiddities as categorical properties are non-structural.
It is plausible for the truths about their instantiation to ground phenomenal truths. But
in this case, quiddities are also the categorical properties that constitute phenomenal
properties, and thus are by definition (proto)phenomenal. Clearly this is a Russellian
version of pan(proto)psychism.
Combining the two arguments shown above, one for phenomenal truths wholly grounded
in structural truths and the other for phenomenal truths not wholly grounded in struc-
tural truths, we conclude that RS entails pan(proto)psychism. These arguments further
shed some light to the type of pan(proto)psychism that RS supports. In fact, if phenom-
enal truths are not wholly grounded in structural truths, then they are also grounded
in (proto)phenomenal truths of the constitutive microsystems. This supports a constitu-
tive version of pan(proto)psychism. On the other hand, if phenomenal truths are wholly
grounded in structural truths, then this suggests contingent laws that connect structural
properties to phenomenal properties. We term this version of non-constitutive panpsy-
chism structural panpsychism.
Utilising the symmetry between micro- and macrosystems provided by RS, we may
further argue that RS supports a Russellian version of pan(proto)psychism. We get to
know the spin state of an electron by coupling it to our brain state (via an apparatus).
The electron and the brain collectively are in a superposed state of |up, perceiving up〉
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and |down, perceiving down〉. The brain states, |perceiving up〉 and |perceiving down〉,
are distinguished from the inside, i.e. from their distinct macrophenomenal properties. It
is thereby plausible that the distinct macrophenomenal properties serve as the categorical
bases for the distinct macrophysical properties of the two brain states (or observer states).
According to RS, the electron has a definite spin state only relative to a definite
observer state, say, |up〉 relative to |perceiving up〉. This relation is arguably symmet-
ric, i.e. it is also reasonable to say that a definite observer state is only relative to a
definite spin state of the electron. Since observer states can be distinguished categor-
ically by macrophenomenal properties, spin states of the electron can be distinguished
categorically as well, by their distinct micro(proto)phenomenal properties. Therefore,
micro(proto)phenomenal properties ground microphysical properties categorically. The
technical details are listed as follows:
1. If RS is true, then a measurement imposes a symmetric relation (a relative-to rela-
tion) between distinct microphysical states (of a microsystem) and distinct macrophysical
states (of an observer).
2. Distinct phenomenal properties (e.g. perceiving up and perceiving down) are categor-
ical bases for distinct macrophysical states (e.g. |perceiving up〉 and |perceiving down〉).
3. If distinct microphysical states (e.g. |up〉 and |down〉) are relative to distinct macro-
physical states (e.g. |perceiving up〉 and |perceiving down〉), and the latter are grounded
categorically in distinct phenomenal properties (e.g. perceiving up and perceiving down),
then distinct microphysical states are also relative to these phenomenal properties.
4. If distinct physical states of a microsystem are relative to distinct phenomenal prop-
erties of the observer, then inversely distinct physical states of the observer are relative
to distinct (proto)phenomenal properties of the microsystem.
5. If distinct physical states of the observer are relative to distinct microsystem proper-
ties both physically (point 1) and (proto)phenomenally (point 4), then distinct physical
properties of the microsystem are associated with distinct (proto)phenomenal properties.
6. If distinct microphysical properties are associated with distinct micro(proto)phenomenal
properties, then the latter are the categorical bases for the former.
∴ 7. If RS is true, then micro(proto)phenomenal properties of a microsystem are the
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The argument, despite being complex, is conceptually clear. We can explain it
schematically using the figure above. The dashed arrows denote the grounding rela-
tions and the solid arrows are the relative-to relations endorsed by the RS interpretation.
These arrows are indexed according to their orders in the argument. The RS interpreta-
tion provides symmetry between micro- and macrosystems in a measurement, represented
by the “mirror” placed in the middle. The argument starts from arrow 1 (rightwards)
and arrow 2. Together they entail arrow 3. Arrow 3 is then mirrored to arrow 4, which
combined with arrow 1 (leftwards) entails arrow 5.
Some points of the argument may require further clarification. On point 4, the mea-
suring system which conventionally involves an apparatus and a conscious observer has
nothing special. In fact, how do we define a “measurement” metaphysically? It is ar-
guably just some definite arrangement that couples two originally separated systems.
Under the RS interpretation, the two sides of a measurement are symmetric, in the sense
that a definite physical state of one side is relative to a definite physical state of the other
side and vice versa. Metaphysically, it does not matter which side measures and which
side gets measured. Therefore in a measurement of, say, the spin state of an electron, we
may swap the measuring side and the measured side. The relative-to relation between the
phenomenal properties of the measuring side and the physical properties of the measured
side should hold after the swap. Even if we take a panprotopsychist view, such that the
electron, now regarded as the measuring side, only have protophenomenal properties, the
relative-to relation is arguably still applicable. Otherwise, when certain protophenome-
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nal properties combine to form phenomenal properties, the relative-to relation emerges.
This implies that the relative-to relation emerges only on certain combinations of mi-
crophysical properties. The original relative-to relation, between the physical states of
two systems, is thus contingent and strongly emergent. Since it is unlikely for such a
fundamental and ubiquitous relation to be strongly emergent, the relative-to relation is
arguably applicable for both phenomenal and protophenomenal properties.
On point 5, the premise states that in a measurement defined above, two relative-to
relations are established. The first one is according to point 1, which links the macrophysi-
cal properties of a macrosystem (e.g. |perceiving up〉 or |perceiving down〉 of the observer)
to the microphysical properties of a microsystem (e.g. |up〉 or |down〉 of the electron).
The second one is according to point 4, which links the same macrophysical properties
to the categorical properties of the microsystem (e.g. what it is like to be in |up〉 or
|down〉, if we take a panpsychist view). The relative-to relation is arguably a one-to-one
correspondence. The two relative-to relations thus establish a one-to-one correspondence
between the microphysical properties (e.g. |up〉 or |down〉) and the (proto)phenomenal
properties (e.g. what it is like to be in |up〉 or |down〉). The latter, therefore, distinguish
the former categorically. This rejects the non-Russellian view and suggests that some
(proto)phenomenal properties are categorical bases for microphysical properties.
Overall, RS supports either constitutive Russellian pan(proto)psychism or structural
Russellian panpsychism. The latter, though, cannot avoid objection from the causal argu-
ment. By suggesting that phenomenal properties are connected to structural properties
only contingently (via some psychophysical laws), it leads to either epiphenomenalism
or overdetermination. At any rate, RS rejects most of the options placed on the table,
leaving CRP perhaps the most plausible solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
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3 Ontological Picture
In this section we will discuss the theoretical burdens that RS and CRP have. Despite
being potential solutions to different problems, they actually share pretty much the same
theoretical requirement. We will see if combined together they could provide a unified
ontological picture.
Perhaps the most counter-intuitive part about RS is proposed by the thought ex-
periment of quantum suicide. In this thought experiment, Schro¨dinger’s famous cat is
replaced by an observer, say myself. Therefore, I am simultaneously the observed object
and the observing subject. Critics of RS may therefore claim that RS entails immortal-
ity, for there is always a “branch” in which I survive. This reminds us of Parfit’s (1984)
thought experiment of teletransportation, which leads to the conclusion that personal
identity can be indeterminate. It implies a somewhat deflationary account of subjects
(i.e. subjects of experience), in the sense that they are not metaphysically primitive.
The same issue is faced by constitutive panpsychism, which suggests that microphe-
nomenal properties constitute macrophenomenal properties. If macrosubjects (i.e. sub-
jects of macrophenomenal experience) were primitive, then they could not be constructed
by microsubjects (i.e. subjects of microphenomenal experience) due to the subject/subject
gap (see Chalmers 2015). Even if we adopt the panprotopsychist view, it is still implau-
sible, as combination of protophenomenal properties does not necessitate the existence
of primitive subjects (the nonsubject/subject gap). Therefore, accepting CRP requires
rejecting the view that subjects are metaphysically primitive.
The deflationary view of subjects, despite of being somewhat counter-intuitive, pro-
vides the basis for the viable solutions to both problems, the interpretation of QM and
the hard problem of consciousness. Accepting this view is to feed two birds with one
scone. Perhaps the only plausible option is to admit that subjects are derivative entities,
constructed by bundles of experiences connected by memory. It is also plausible that
subjects are ontologically dependent on a collection of causal chains (or some general set
of relations), consistent with Kripke’s (1972) causal account of reference.
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We may provide more credibility to this deflationary account with the help of in-
trospection. In introspection all we may find are a subject and a phenomenal quality
paired by an awareness relation. They form an inseparable triplet, as Russell wrote in
On Propositions (1919):
The act, or subject, is schematically convenient, but not empirically discoverable.
It seems to serve the some sort of purpose as is served by points and instants, by
numbers and particles and the rest of the apparatus of mathematics. All these
things have to be constructed, not postulated: they are not stuff of the world,
but assemblages which it is convenient to be able to designate as if they were
single things.
Subject does not seem to be an introspective datum. Every time we think about it,
it degrades to an object. Besides, awareness of being a subject is arguably grounded in
the awareness of the subject’s own phenomenal experiences, and perhaps in relation with
external entities. One might object, however, that we are capable of introspecting the
awareness relation alone. When looking into my sensation of red (i.e. the awareness of a
red quality), I am aware of the fact that I sense the red quality, arguably a second-order
awareness. It is actually the awareness of (a representation of) the mental state in which
I sense the red quality. This mental state itself involves the whole triplet (I and the
red quality connected by the red sensation). Therefore, a purely abstract and detached
awareness relation does not seem empirically discoverable. Overall, we will assign the
term “phenomenal property” to the whole inseparable triplet.
Phenomenal properties are commonly defined as properties characterising what it
is like to be a conscious subject. But because accepting CRP and/or RS necessitates
a deflationary account of subjects, such that subjects can be further reduced to, say,
bundles of experiences. Therefore, the definition of phenomenal properties can be further
reduced to topic-neutral terms (here we refer to terms not mentioning subjects explicitly).
A viable option is to replace “subject” in the definition by “state” or “event”, as Russell
wrote in Analysis of Matter (1928):
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A piece of matter is a logical structure composed of events; the causal laws of
the events concerned, and the abstract logical properties of their spatio-temporal
relations, are more or less known, but their intrinsic character is not known.
Therefore, we define phenomenal properties as properties characterising what it is like
to be in a particular state (microstate for a microsystem or macrostate for a macrosys-
tem). This is fully consistent with the RS interpretation. An observer who measures the
spin state of an electron is, along with this electron, in a state superposed by |up, per-
ceiving up〉 and |down, perceiving down〉. Defining phenomenal properties with regard
to states instead of subjects naturally distinguishes the two phenomenal experiences (i.e.
perceiving up and perceiving down) and hence the two outcomes (i.e. spin up and spin
down).
Accepting both CRP and RS provides us with a simple and elegant ontological picture.
Microphysical properties, defined as the properties that characterise microstates disposi-
tionally from the outside, are grounded categorically in micro(proto)phenomenal proper-
ties, from the inside. They constitute macrophysical properties according to the laws of
QM, which are the physical (or dispositional) aspects of the fundamental laws responsible
for combining microstates into macrostates. Isomorphically, there are also phenomenal
(or categorical) aspects of such laws for combining micro(proto)phenomenal properties
into macrophenomenal properties. What we have direct access to (i.e. knowledge by
acquaintance as defined in Russell 1910) are macrophenomenal properties characterising
what it is like to be in a particular brain state.
But what about the preferred basis? For a measurement state superposed by |up, per-
ceiving up〉 and |down, perceiving down〉, presumably only two distinct sets of macrophe-
nomenal properties, perceiving up and perceiving down, are present. However, it is
unclear why superposed consciousness cannot exist. There is a physical counterpart of
this question: Why does the spin measurement result in either |up〉 or |down〉 rather than
the superposition? Quantum Darwinism proposed by Zurek (2009) provides a plausible
answer: Unitary evolution alone can lead to a preferred basis as a result of environment-
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induced superselection. Pointer states (e.g. |up〉 and |down〉) are those orthogonal states
that, without being disturbed or destroyed, can be widely copied and disseminated by
the environment. Superposed states, on the other hand, cannot leave sufficient copies
in the environment. During a measurement all we can access are actually the plentiful
descendants left in the environment. Effectively, the environment serves as an essential
witness and communication channel for the microstate being measured.
The same mechanism may apply to macrophenomenal properties. The brain itself
provides a plentiful environment, acting as a witness of the microstates involved. Due to
quantum Darwinism, a macrostate is constituted by widely copied and disseminated mi-
crostates, as a superposition of, say, |perceiving up〉1|perceiving up〉2|perceiving up〉3 · · ·
and |perceiving down〉1|perceiving down〉2|perceiving down〉3 · · · , where 1, 2, 3, · · · are in-
dices of subsystems in the brain. As a result, the subspace spanned by |perceiving up〉
and |perceiving down〉 has a natural basis consisting of orthogonal pointer states. These
states are grounded categorically in distinct phenomenal properties, characterising what
it is like to know the electron spins up and spins down respectively. This is consistent with
the no-cloning theorem (see Wootters and Zurek 1982) which claims that it is only pos-
sible to clone a certain set of orthogonal quantum states (|perceiving up〉 and |perceiving
down〉 are in this set while their superpositions are not).
As a final note, the interpretation puzzle about quantum mechanical probabilities
may be mentioned here. Critics of RS sometimes argue that if distinct measurement
outcomes are observed only by distinct subjects, then they should all have a probability
of one. Surely the situation is a bit counter-intuitive, as we usually talk about proba-
bility only in the context of a single subject, which is presumably identical over time.
However, we have already rejected this presumption by accepting a deflationary account
of subjects. Indeed, all we have are distinct phenomenal properties that ground distinct
physical properties categorically. Quantum mechanical probability can therefore be inter-
preted objectively, as the conditional probability of either certain physical properties or
their grounding phenomenal properties. Such interpretation is within the context of the
single quantum world (although it can have many classical “miniworlds”), or the “mul-
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tiverse” (see Bousso and Susskind 2012). For example, the probability of |up〉 may be
interpreted as the probability of instantiation of the perceiving-up phenomenal properties
after the measurement, conditional to the physical and phenomenal properties before the
measurement.
4 The Combination Problem
Pan(proto)psychism, especially constitutive pan(proto)psychism, faces a major challenge
of the combination problem: How do micro(proto)phenomenal properties constitute the
kind of macrophenomenal properties that we are familiar with? It was first proposed by
William James in The Principles of Psychology (1895):
Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise
altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as
you can (whatever that may mean); still each remains the same feeling it always
was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are
and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group
or series of such feelings were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as
such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100
original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation,
when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it,
nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in
any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it.
James seems to argue that phenomenal properties cannot aggregate into further phe-
nomenal properties. However, this intuition about property combination is arguably
grounded in our intuition about classical physics. In QM it is plausible that combining
distinct properties brings in extra information.
Let’s assign a property to an electron. For example, we can assign a definite value
19
(up or down) to its spin, which is regarded as a random variable denoted by S. The
amount of information that is introduced by this assignment is measured by the mutual
information: I(A;S) = H(A)+H(S)−H(A, S) in whichA is the state of the electron with
an unspecified spin. If the electron were a classical object, H would be (joint) Shannon
entropy that follows H(A) ≤ H(A, S) (see Cover and Thomas 2012). Therefore, the
information introduced by the spin property, I(A;S), can never exceed H(S), which is
the amount of information carried by the spin property alone. But in reality the electron
is quantum-mechanical. So Shannon entropy needs to be replaced by Von Neumann
entropy, which no longer follows the inequality. In an extreme case, the electron stays in
a pure state |a,up〉 + |b,down〉. This implies H(A, S) = 0 but H(A) > 0, for properties
other than the spin can only be described probabilistically by a density matrix.
The example above shows that in a quantum system, a property can bring in more
information than that contained in the property alone. If we accept that the brain is a
macroscopic quantum system (indeed it is, according to RS which holds QM is universal),
then it is not implausible that combining phenomenal properties reveals extra phenomenal
properties. James’s argument arises from the intuition about our living world, which can
be explained by classical physics sufficiently well. Such intuition might not apply to the
macrophenomenal properties that characterise the macrostates of our brains, which are
quantum-mechanical by their very nature.
4.1 The subject combination problem
James further argued in The Principles of Psychology (1895):
Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one
word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each
think of this word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness
of the whole sentence. We talk of the ‘spirit of the age,’ and the ‘sentiment of
the people,’ and in various ways we hypostatize ‘public opinion.’ But we know
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this to be symbolic speech, and never dream that the spirit, opinion, sentiment,
etc., constitute a consciousness other than, and additional to, that of the several
individuals whom the words ‘age,’ ‘people,’ or ‘public’ denote. The private minds
do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind.
This point is pretty clear. If the phenomenal properties of individuals cannot ag-
gregate into some sort of “collective” phenomenal properties, then how could the mi-
cro(proto)phenomenal properties of particles aggregate into the macrophenomenal prop-
erties of our own? Given that we already take a deflationary account of subjects, a
co-consciousness relation (see Chalmers 2017) seems to be sufficient for the explanatory
purpose. It is plausible that the co-consciousness relation applies to phenomenal proper-
ties associated with one individual, but fails to apply to those associated with different
individuals.
But what exactly is this co-consciousness relation? If micro(proto)phenomenal proper-
ties ground microphysical properties, then arguably such relations applied to micro(proto)-
phenomenal properties ground certain relations in the physical world. We do have a
good candidate in a pure quantum world. According to quantum Darwinism, the en-
vironment serves as a communication channel that clones and disseminates information
about pointer states. It is a lossy channel in the sense that only classical information (i.e.
information about pointer states) gets transferred. Full (or a large extent of) quantum
information, on the other hand, cannot be retrieved, unless we can access the full (or
most of the) environment and the numerous copies left in the environment.
This mechanism establishes a co-accessibility relation in the physical world: Two sets
of microphysical properties that fully characterise two microsystems are co-accessible if
and only if the quantum information of either can be (almost) fully retrieved in the
environment (or neighbourhood) of the other. Take the brain system as an example.
For two distinct particles inside the same brain (or its essential subsystem responsible
for consciousness), it is in principle possible that the information about the quantum
state of one particle can be fully (or to a large extent) retrieved from the environment
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of the other. In this case, the microphysical properties of the two particles are co-
accessible. This, of course, relies on the boundary of the environment. We may regard
co-accessibility as being relative to the macrophenomenal properties under consideration.
Since macrophenomenal properties characterise the state of a macrosystem categorically,
the boundary of the environment is arguably the boundary of the macrosystem, which is
well-defined.
The co-consciousness relation between two micro(proto)phenomenal properties is what
grounds the co-accessibility relation of the corresponding microphysical properties. If
two microsystems are connected by a classical communication channel, then the mi-
cro(proto)phenomenal properties that ground the respective microphysical properties are
not co-conscious. Between two macrophenomenal properties, co-consciousness can be
constructed by aggregating the co-consciousness relations between their constitutive mi-
cro(proto)phenomenal properties. Here the classical communication channel is a commu-
nication channel that has a lossy bottleneck, such that a large proportion of copies (of
quantum states) are dissipated, incapable of being collected again. For instance, commu-
nication between two individual brains is mediated by their bodies and the surrounding
physical world. Much of the copies originating from one brain are thus dissipated, rather
than being collected by the other brain.
Let’s conduct this analysis in more detail. The macrophenomenal properties of two
individuals are the properties that categorically characterise their brain states. They
correspond to two disjoint macrosystems, either their brains or some essential subsystems
of their brains. Due to the classical communication channel between them, microphysical
properties in one macrosystem are not fully accessible in the other macrosystem. This
lack of co-accessibility is grounded in the fact that the micro(proto)phenomenal properties
which ground the microphysical properties are not co-conscious. Constituted by these
microphenomenal properties, macrophenomenal properties of the two individuals are not
co-conscious.
In general, physical properties of other brains can only reach us via classical com-
munication channels, thus only the classical information (about half of the full quantum
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information, measured by mutual information as in Zurek 2009) are directly accessible.
Even if we could obtain the full knowledge about a quantum state from measurements,
it is, in fact, inferred from the classical information recorded by the apparatus. The
co-consciousness relation by its nature is absent between the phenomenal properties of
two brains, as Russell commented in Analysis of Matter (1928):
The usual view would be that by psychology we acquire knowledge of our ‘minds,’
but that the only way to acquire knowledge of our brains is to have them ex-
amined by a physiologist, usually after we are dead, which seems somewhat
unsatisfactory. I should say that what the physiologist sees when he looks at a
brain is part of his own brain, not part of the brain he is examining.
On the other hand, our own brain states are what we have direct access to. The brain
itself serves as the environment and the witness of its constitutive microphysical proper-
ties. Since it (or some part of it) is directly accessible, the full information (or at least
more than the classical information) about the microphysical properties is also directly
accessible. Any two macrophenomenal properties that characterise the same brain state
are constituted by their respective microphenomenal properties, which are co-conscious,
for the grounded microphysical properties are co-accessible within the boundary of the
same macrosystem (the brain or its essential part). Constituted by co-conscious microphe-
nomenal properties, these macrophenomenal properties themselves are co-conscious. In
conclusion, there is always a co-consciousness relation between macrophenomenal proper-
ties that characterise the same brain state. Together with the analysis given in previous
paragraphs, we have a plausible explanation of the fact that phenomenal properties are
private knowledge, which can only be revealed from a first-person perspective.
4.2 The quality combination problem
The quality combination problem concerns the combination rules of the qualities involved
in micro(proto)phenomenal properties. The major objection comes from the palette
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problem, which argues that the limited qualities of micro(proto)phenomenal properties
cannot combine into the plentiful qualities of macrophenomenal properties.
Despite that macrophenomenal properties presumably deal with pointer states only,
e.g. either perceiving up or perceiving down but not their superpositions, micro(proto)-
phenomenal properties are not limited by this. According to quantum Darwinism, objec-
tive existence in its classical sense, i.e. an object appearing only in one of its pointer states,
is merely due to the environment playing a role of witness. Micro(proto)phenomenal prop-
erties, on the other hand, concern the microsystem itself, irrespective of the environment.
An electron can therefore have micro(proto)phenomenal properties associated with states
of definite spins along the z-axis, as well as states of definite spins along the x-axis, despite
the fact that the environment cannot record both.
It is therefore plausible that even a single electron can have rich qualities of mi-
cro(proto)phenomenal properties. Our intuition about a microscopic object such as an
electron is formed by our direct observation. But what we actually observe are the numer-
ous copies of its pointer states left in the environment, not the object itself. Therefore,
only the pointer states are directly perceivable. Micro(proto)phenomenal properties, on
the other hand, ground microphysical properties of the object alone. There are arguably
distinct micro(proto)phenomenal properties associated with every state in the Hilbert
space, not merely the pointer states.
The palette problem does not seem to be an issue. But we need to take a step further
and ask how these different qualities actually combine. Chalmers commented in The
Combination Problem for Panpsychism (2017):
If the same entity simultaneously is aware of a degree of redness and aware of
a degree of whiteness (at the same location), it is plausibly aware of pinkness
(at that location). But in general separately instantiated qualities (the redness
and whiteness of distinct objects) do not yield a combined quality, and nor do
separately instantiated phenomenal qualities.
24
This indeed imposes a restriction on the nature of the combination rules. It is arguably
related to the structure combination problem (see Sec 4.3), which asks for an explanation
of the spatial structure of our visual fields. For now, let’s suppose this phenomenal spatial
structure is given. As Chalmers suggested, a phenomenal quality can combine with those
in its neighbourhood (in the visual field), but not with those that are further away.
Perhaps the co-consciousness relation proposed in Sec 4.1 needs to be further enriched
by a metric (or at least topological) structure.
As a binary relation between phenomenal properties, co-consciousness guarantees the
two connected phenomenal qualities can be experienced simultaneously. It does not pre-
vent us from further exploring a stronger version though, such that the two connected
phenomenal qualities are not only experienced simultaneously, but also combine into one
uniform quality. It is plausible that the co-consciousness relation is structured hierarchi-
cally. For example, among all the co-conscious pairs of phenomenal properties, some may
be bonded even more closely. We select these pairs and level up their pairing relations
to a “level-1 co-consciousness relation”. We may continue to apply the selection pro-
cess to the set of all level-1 co-conscious pairs in order to get a level-2 co-consciousness
relation, etc. By repeating this procedure, we end up with a hierarchical structure of
co-consciousness relations.
The hierarchical structure of co-consciousness relations presumably grounds an iso-
morphic structure of co-accessibility relations between physical properties, such that a
subset of co-accessible pairs can have stronger dependence or bonding. As illustrated
in the beginning of Sec 4, these pairs may have smaller von Neumann joint entropies,
resulting in higher mutual information. This means that the pairs yield more information
on combination, a result of quantum entanglement. Alternatively, recall that on defining
the co-accessibility relation in Sec 4.1, we mentioned that the relation is only relative, in
the sense that it does depend on the boundary of the system under consideration. We
may therefore divide the whole brain into subsystems, such that the microphysical prop-
erties within one subsystem are co-conscious not only relative to the whole brain, but also
relative to this subsystem. This serves as the physical basis of the level-1 co-accessibility
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relation, whose categorical basis is the level-1 co-consciousness relation. Within each of
the subsystems, we may perform further division to obtain the level-2 co-accessibility
relation, level-3 co-accessibility relation, etc.
4.3 The structure combination problem
This version of combination problem concerns the mismatch between the structure of
macrophenomenal properties and the structure of macrophysical properties (say the struc-
ture observed when examining someone else’s brain). As argued in Sec 2.2, it is not the
spatial structure that matters, but the structure of some abstract relations (e.g. causal
or co-consciousness relations). If quantum mechanics is universal, then such structure
derives arguably from the structure of Hilbert space. Since Hilbert space has a linear and
homogeneous structure, it is capable of providing a smooth and homogeneous structure
for the phenomenal properties.
An especially important example is the spatial structure of the visual and auditory
fields that we perceive. We have seen in Sec 4.2 that different levels of co-consciousness
relations can be established, perhaps by dividing the brain into less dependent (or less
entangled) subsystems hierarchically. In correspondence to this, Hilbert space of the
whole brain is decomposed into factors hierarchically, such that the brain state, as a vector
in Hilbert space, contains strongly entangled components within a factor space while less
entangled components in different factors. This provides a basis for the phenomenal
spatial structure, for the hierarchical structure of factors is isomorphic to the hierarchical
structure of point sets in the phenomenal space. In this way, co-consciousness relations
supply a topology for the phenomenal space.
Co-consciousness relation therefore serves as a key component of solving the phe-
nomenal binding problem. Its hierarchical structure grounds the phenomenal spatial
structure. Since co-consciousness grounds co-accessibility between physical properties,
this hierarchical structure should manifest itself in the physical world as well. This im-
plies that the physical spatial structure is emergent too, from the hierarchical structure of
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co-accessibility relations and ultimately quantum information. Indeed, this is a promising
account of physical space endorsed by Cao and Carroll (2018), suggesting that the Eu-
clidean metric of the physical space derives from quantum mutual information (defined in
the beginning of Sec 4). We can conclude that the similarity between phenomenal spatial
structure and physical spatial structure is at least partly due to the similar mechanisms
responsible for their emergence. Both spatial structures emerge from quantum informa-
tion, in the form of the hierarchical co-consciousness/co-accessibility relations. Utilising
quantum mechanics therefore resolves the structural mismatch between the physical and
the phenomenal.
Can we say anything more about the relation between the physical and the phe-
nomenal? Because both have isomorphic structures grounded in co-consciousness/co-
accessibility relations, we might further speculate that the whole quantum cosmos is
conscious. The physical space simply emerges from the co-consciousness relations of this
giant conscious subject. This is, however, a wild speculation and I am not positioned to
claim it is plausible. At any rate, quantum information plays a role in the constitution of
the physical world as well as our own consciousness in the form of co-consciousness/co-
accessibility relations. It is, therefore, completely natural to have a certain degree of
structural similarity between the physical world and our own consciousness. This ought
to be appreciated, because only by this similarity can we have a prior concept of space-
time and the capacity of understanding the physical world so well.
4.4 The report combination problem
This version of the combination problem is associated with the metaproblem of conscious-
ness regarding how we report our phenomenal truths (see Chalmers 2018). The problem
may be formulated as how the micro(proto)phenomenal properties combine to result in
reports about consciousness.
In fact, if the reports about consciousness could be explained solely by topic-neutral
terms that do not mention consciousness itself (or anything grounded in phenomenal
27
truths), then our intuition about consciousness could be false and consciousness could be
just an illusion. However, it is probably true that such a topic-neutral explanation can
never be achieved, as the reports about consciousness are indeed grounded in phenomenal
truths. This is consistent with, and perhaps entailed by, the RS interpretation of QM.
Consider our old friend, the measurement of an electron’s spin state. If we hold a
illusionist view of consciousness, we would probably represent the whole system by a
superposition of |up, reporting up〉 and |down, reporting down〉. We use “reporting”
instead of “perceiving” because “perceiving up” (or “perceiving down”) was used to
designate a set of phenomenal properties. Since we now take a illusionist view, there is
no such thing as “perceiving” in its phenomenal sense, and we may describe the system
only in pure physical terms. But then how do we explain the fact that only one outcome
gets reported, or at least we only “feel” one such report? Illusionism, or at least its
strong version, denies there is something it is like to be in a certain state (e.g. perceiving
up or perceiving down). Ontologically, the two reports or outcomes are equally real.
It is therefore not clear why we only “feel” one outcome, rather than both or their
superposition.
If we admit that our own consciousness is real, then according to Sec 2.2, RS entails
pan(proto)psychism. We now face the report combination problem. Our strategy is to
show that reports about consciousness are indeed grounded in phenomenal truths. In
fact, the “branching” of the two spin states in the measurement is arguably grounded in
the mutual exclusiveness of the underlying phenomenal properties. That is to say, there
lacks a co-consciousness relation between the two phenomenal properties (i.e. perceiving
up and perceiving down), and the apparent branching of the measurement outcomes is
grounded in this absence of co-consciousness. We may formulate this argument in the
following way:
1. If RS is true, then the whole measurement system can be in superposition.
2. On a superposed measurement state, all alternative reports exist ontologically.
3. In any measurement, it is only possible to report a definite outcome.
4. If all reports exist ontologically while only a definite outcome is “actually” reported,
28
then there has to be an epistemic branching of alternative reports.
5. Epistemic branching between reports (reporting up and reporting down) is grounded
in the lack of co-consciousness between perceptions (perceiving up and perceiving down).
6. If report of perception is not grounded in perception, any relation between alternative
reports is not grounded in relations between perceptions.
∴ 7. If RS is true, then the report of perception is grounded in perception.
One might reject point 5 by resorting to certain co-accessibility relations between
physical properties, claiming that the apparent branching is grounded in physical relations
instead of phenomenal relations. However, according to Sec 2.2, RS entails the Russellian
version of pan(proto)psychism. This means that the co-accessibility relation itself is
grounded in certain relation between phenomenal properties. Therefore, the apparent
branching is still grounded in some phenomenal relation. Whatever it is, the argument
continues to hold.
“Perception” in the argument above may be replaced by any phenomenal terms, such
as feeling, experience, or more generally, state of consciousness. So how do we respond to
the report combination problem? We have shown that reports about macrophenomenal
truths are indeed grounded in macrophenomenal truths. Also there are not many concep-
tual obstacles to the combination of micro(proto)phenomenal properties into macrophe-
nomenal properties, for in the previous sections we have already proposed plausible solu-
tions to other combination problems. Putting them together, we get the proposition that
reports about macrophenomenal truths are grounded in micro(proto)phenomenal truths.
The combination of micro(proto)phenomenal properties, which forms the correspond-
ing macrophenomenal properties, also plays a central role in reporting such phenome-
nal properties. Co-consciousness relations between micro(proto)phenomenal properties,
which add up to the co-consciousness relation between macrophenomenal properties, are
causally responsible for the apparent branching of their reports.
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5 Concluding Remarks
If we can accept the deflationary account of subjects, then both CRP and RS are per-
missible. In particular, together they provide us with a unified ontological picture that
may solve the combination problem. The conceivability of the panpsychist zombie is
arguably rooted in our prior knowledge about subjects (e.g. separation between the
quality/object and the awareness/subject). But if such knowledge is not justified, the
conceivability argument no longer holds. In fact, the essence of a subject is arguably
constituted by a bundle of co-conscious phenomenal properties. It therefore rigidly desig-
nates the same bundle of phenomenal properties in every world (actual or counterfactual),
and connects to the reference or name of the biological entity only contingently. At any
rate, having the same micro(proto)phenomenal (and microphysical) properties but dif-
ferent or non-existent macrophenomenal properties is inconceivable. Besides, macrophe-
nomenal properties are not subject to the causal argument, for they are constituted by
micro(proto)phenomenal properties which ground physical properties categorically. We
may conclude that the ontological picture proposed here is immune to the argument from
either side (i.e. the conceivability argument or the causal argument).
Apart from sharing the same requirement of deflationary subjects, CRP and RS both
realise symmetry between micro- and macrosystems. They are mutually supportive, thus
providing a new perspective of solving either the hard problem of consciousness or the
interpretation puzzle of QM. More important, RS provides feasible options to solve the
combination problem, which seems to be the most severe obstacle to CRP. Overall, I
think there is sufficient credibility for us to at least consider the combination of CRP and
RS as one of the plausible options for explaining the very nature of our consciousness and
our world. To summarise our current position, we list some of the main propositions as
follows:
1. If rejecting CRP, we would suffer from either the conceivability/knowledge argument
or the causality argument on explaining consciousness.
2. Accepting CRP makes RS perhaps the most plausible interpretation of QM.
3. Accepting RS supports CRP, and provides viable solutions to different versions of the
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combination problem faced by CRP.
∴ 4. It is perhaps plausible to accept both CRP and RS.
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